Much of the argument was around industrial decline, maintaining skills and full employment but what it was really all about was the military-industrial interests in the State ensuring that it would be 'business as usual' as Communism collapsed. It is not historical destiny which makes the British warlike, but particular political and military programmes of the recent past. Without decades of government support there would be no Rolls-Royce today. One common assumption was that governments were pig-headedly stupid and short-sighted. Perhaps his use of the term simply gave him space to be a bit more assertive early in his career. Indeed it is worth remembering that in the 1940s and 1950s lots and lots of countries had jet fighter programmes that went nowhere. The scale of the military-industrial state constructed out of the 'reforms' of 1916 equivalent to the allegedly progressive quasi-fascism of Woodrow Wilson and the real thing produced by Mussolini and through the Cold War saw only one serious attempted check.
Thank you for reading Hush-Kit. It will be essential reading for those working on the history and historiography of twentieth-century Britain, the historical sociology of war and the history of science and technology. This lays us open to confusion but also to manipulation. It has brilliantly adapted its form to exist at the expense of the people - even today. England had the strongest air force in the Great War, the largest industry in the world in the 1920s, outproduced Germany by 50% at the time of the Battle of Britain and was the third largest producers of aeroplanes well after this time. This is dealt with in greater detail in relation to the Second World War in his latest book which we hope to review later in the year but the point he is making is important for a reason he does not give - how our perceptions are formed by group consensus rather than the facts.
It turns out that though lots of people concerned with aviation in the 1930s claimed to have been prescient in seeing the dangers of Hitler and Mussolini, and thus argued for air rearmament, many were in fact Nazi and fascist sympathisers. None of this was spoken of. He has written for such publications as Prospect, the London Review of Books, Nature, Times Higher Education Supplement, and The Guardian, and has often appeared on television and radio. What are the big myths in our popular ideas of British aviation or British aviation history? The book is set in the context of a historical debate about 'decline' that has been the standard psychological currency for anyone educated before the mid-1990s - whether from the Right or the Left. Third, that Right and Left are meaningless because both have been captured by the State and can only become meaningful when the Right means Republican Virtue in the manner of De Jouvenel and the Left means the Commonweal in the manner of the English revolutionaries.
Books prices are provided by the merchants and MyShopping assumes no responsibility for accuracy of price information. So I would say that in the early twentieth century the United Kingdom was more warlike than myth suggested, much more so, but it is only in recent years that we have had a gleeful indulgence in military adventurism overseas. This has to raise questions about a more recent invention, the internet. How much of the current story of the internet and its purpose and use as well as its relationship to freedom and power is truly understood by these commentators. Reviews: 'A brilliant polemic' Guardian 'Full of good stories. To which the response might be, more Concordes ors would have done even more damage to the industry rather than strengthened it. And, if they do not understand the crude nature of power and history, why are we listening to them? One would really have to know an awful lot about these particular projects, and the competition, and the requirements.
The familiar image of the British in the Second World War is that of the plucky underdog taking on German might. He is also the author of the iconoclastic and brilliant The Shock of the Old: Technology and Global History Since 1900. This was a blessing, as my research was taking me into rethinking the history of British strategy and the whole issue of the British decline, then a hot topic. His arguments provide sound backing for the idea that modern Britain is as much a warfare state as a welfare one' Economist About the author: David Edgerton is Hans Rausing Professor at Imperial College London, where he was the founding director of the Centre for the History of Science, Technology and Medicine. The experience appears to have radicalised Tony Benn into becoming an easily discreditable target of that same elite, while Wilson developed a partially justifiable paranoia about the right's determination to destroy him. The is a fascinating read, as is. Alas there is much less appreciation of the real significance of engines, than the supposed significance of particular airframes.
The history of England and the aeroplane is one tangled with myths - of 'the Few' and the Blitz, of boffins, flying machines, amateur inventors and muddling through. In England and the Aeroplane David Edgerton reverses received wisdom, showing that the aeroplane is a central and revealing aspect of an unfamiliar English nation: a warfare state dedicated to technology, industry, empire and military power. The first was that liberals loved aeroplanes and saw them as means of overcoming barriers between nations and people, and indeed for waging efficient war against barbarians. I am also sold on the idea that an advanced technology like aviation is transformative of political and economic structures and, another Edgerton proposal, that technological progress and modernity are very much at home, possibly more at home, on the Right than on the Left. The internet is currently seen as giving us 'empowerment' but also 'child porn'. Until the 1940s the United Kingdom was, Edgerton argues, an exceptional place: liberal, capitalist and anti-nationalist, at the heart of a European and global web of trade and influence. Since the 1990s at least they have shown an unseemly desire to go to war, and have succeeded in doing so.
His arguments provide sound backing for the idea that modern Britain is as much a warfare state as a welfare one' Economist About the author: David Edgerton is Hans Rausing Professor at Imperial College London, where he was the founding director of the Centre for the History of Science, Technology and Medicine. Now, I fear that a certain kind of Brexiteer revivalist fantasising has overstressed British success in aviation. Reviews:'A brilliant polemic' Guardian'Full of good stories. This liberal internationalism is not as lovely and cuddly it seems. No, the lessons for me are several. Edgerton's thesis is very important. Let it be noted that these and other places where British troops were engaged, were once under British control.
After teaching the economics of science and technology and the history of science and technology at the , he became the founding director of the Centre for the History of Science, Technology and Medicine at Imperial College, London, and Hans Rausing Professor. Nor should be downplay success — the aero-engine industry has been successful, a very rare example of large British manufacturing firm having a serious place in world markets. The history of England and the aeroplane is one tangled with myths - of 'the Few' and the Blitz, of boffins, flying machines, amateur inventors and muddling through. This was what I called liberal militarism though it had other features too. More recently, opinion has changed, perhaps not surprisingly given the policies of successive governments.
This book is, above all, a study of the relationship between a new and advanced technology aviation and its adaptation to the interests of the state and its eventual reformulation as a doctrine of mass murder in the mass bombing campaigns of the 1930s and 1940s. Furthermore, stories change over time. Yet the end result was a vindication of this vision. If the book has a message for me, it may not be one intended by Edgerton. It is usual to see the United Kingdom as an island of continuity in an otherwise convulsed and unstable Europe; its political history a smooth sequence of administrations, from building a welfare state to coping with decline. In short, it is a very complex issue which is discussed in simplistic ways. The story of British aviation was basically the story of the fighter, of the moment of genius of 1940, the exception that proved the rule of decrepitude.
In a revelatory recounting of the story of aeronautical England, from its politics to its industry and culture, David Edgerton reconfigures some of the most important chapters of our history. He describes, through the medium of aviation history, how early aviation strategies were strongly lnked to the political imperial Right - as readers of Nevile Shute's novels will quickly recognise. England had the strongest air force in the Great War, the largest industry in the world in the 1920s, outproduced Germany by 50% at the time of the Battle of Britain and was the third largest producers of aeroplanes well after this time. I think it is up to those who suggest they were potentially great aircraft to make the case, but this is no easy task. Back then, the story was one of aeronautical weakness, before 1914, in the interwar years, and indeed after the Second World War as well. He is also the author of the iconoclastic and brilliant The Shock of the Old: Technology and Global History Since 1900. This book is a comprehensive study of the history of British science and technology in relation to economic performance.