The French army was arranged with two lines of infantry in the center, squadrons of cavalry on each wing, and with a thin line of artillery at the front. There is also a certain fuzziness over what Gonzalez de Leon characterises as the forcible remilitarisation of the Castilian nobility. The Army of Flanders was one of the pre-eminent military formations of early modern Europe, a pillar of Spanish Habsburg power as well as the military academy of successive generations of European aristocrats. Aristocrats expected senior posts preferably independent ones so there was a proliferation of detached commands with unclear lines of authority between them, a tendency for command by committee and rampant rank inflation. It deals with all the major figures, including Wallerstein and Richelieu, Gustavus Adolphus and Tilly, the Winter King and the Habsburg emperors. The Eighty Years War 1567-1659 has been the subject of important monographs but the high command of the Army of Flanders, which played a decisive role in the making of Spanish strategy and was in charge of its tactics, has eluded detailed scrutiny.
Having agreed to those terms, the remains of the two tercios left the field with deployed flags and weapons. Enghien advanced along the Oise road and assembled his force along a ridge looking down on the besieged town of Rocroi. He argues that aristocrats were not being appointed to senior positions on the basis that they would assume financial responsibility for their commands; instead they had to be bullied and bribed to undertake command roles with funding diverted from functions like intelligence gathering to subsidise them and promotion structures loaded in their favour. As the author is careful to mention, there were some exceptions and a few aristocrats did turn into decent senior officers. Written with great clarity and liveliness, the book brings alive the period in all its aspects. He ordered a huge cavalry encirclement, achieved via a sweeping strike behind the Spanish army. This revised second edition includes some new sources and updates some references but otherwise remains faithful to the original version.
As such it has naturally attracted the attention of scholars; in the English speaking world most notably the classic works of Geoffrey Parker and I A A Thompson. The Origins and Development of the Dutch Revolt brings together in one volume the latest scholarship from leading experts in the field, to illuminate why the Dutch revolted, the way events unfolded and how they gained independence. At this point in the fighting the French left and center were in distress. There are perhaps a few limits to this book. The Spanish troops under advanced to and besieged , a fortress town garrisoned by a few hundred French.
As Geoffrey Parker points out, this was more money than many European kings could spend. The situation was further complicated by fragmentation on national lines. Even so, the Army of Flanders was open to tactical innovation and had success in the field. The Spanish quickly formed up between the town and the ridge. Learning of the French advance, de Melo decided to engage the oncoming forces rather than invest in the siege of Rocroi, as his army was stronger than that of the French.
. Manual and hard labour was also prized during Alba and Parma's tenure. Clearly additional factors were at work which require further elucidation. The , commander of a French army in , was appointed to stop the Spanish incursion. Oh how I love his focus on command. His first response, the establishment of military academies, fizzled out. From United Kingdom to U.
The updated bibliographical information provides an invaluable resource, synthesising the major work in the field, in all languages, up to 1996. Also contains some startling revelations: under Alba promotions were based on a highly meritocratic system, so that the highest positions of command were occupied by men like Verdugo who hailed from the lowest levels of society. While he does deserve much of the blame, the King largely escapes his own share, although he clearly was not of the same calibre of his grandfather. The Eighty Years War 1567-1659 has been the subject of important monographs but the high command of the Army of Flanders, which played a decisive role in the making of Spanish strategy and was in charge of its tactics, has eluded detailed scrutiny. About this Item: Brill, 2009. Nevertheless, the author shows that these inexperienced Spanish officers weakened the high command, had little ability to command in the field, and held prejudices against other nationalities serving in command postitions in the multi-national Army of Flanders.
Mazarin's alliance with England resulted in the defeat of the Spanish at the and consequently the taking of in 1658, prior to the in 1659. Few of his successors, with the exception of Alexander Farnese perhaps although he was Italian, not Spanish… , were so competent, exercised such authority and had such successes. Using a unique combination of surviving records, he presented strikingly the logistical problems of fighting wars in early modern Europe, and demonstrated why Spain failed to suppress the Dutch Revolt. Of the 7,000 Spanish infantry only 390 officers and 1,386 enlisted men were able to escape back to the Spanish Netherlands. Drawing on a huge body of source material from different languages and countries throughout Europe, it provided a clear and comprehensive narrative and analytical account of the subject. This effort to remilitarise the Spanish nobility largely failed.
The Eighty Years War 1567-1659 has been the subject of important monographs but the high command of the Army of Flanders, which played a decisive role in the making of Spanish strategy and was in charge of its tactics, has eluded detailed scrutiny. Through his vivid and gripping diary entries, a picture emerges of a man caught in the crossfire of international events and spiralling towards a tragic denouement. Arriving into Berlin under a false identity, Casement entered a space of conspiracy and subterfuge. In exploring the desire of the Dutch to control their own affairs, it also questions whether Dutch identity came about by accident. Interestingly, that author contrasts this with what was happened at the time to the French aristocracy whose eagerness to serve even at great cost to themselves contrasted hugely with that of the Spanish. Despite this, the battle was of great symbolic importance because of the high reputation of the. The author explains the decline of the officer corps and high command of the Army of Flanders that led to demoralized and incompetent leadership with poor military results during the last two decades of this period.